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WISCONSIN HOUSING CODES NOT AN
IMPLIED PART OF A LEASE
After inspecting an apartment in Posnanski's building and finding
its condition good except for the locks on the doors, Hood made an
oral month-to-month lease with Posnanski. After occupying the apart-
ment for several months Hood vacated; he was several months in
arrears in rent. In defense of Posnanski's suit for payment of rent,
Hood alleged that the existence of several violations of the Milwaukee
Housing Code voided his obligation to pay the accrued rent. Hood
testified that the violations existed because Posnanski failed upon
notice to repair the plaster on the ceiling of the bathroom and
kitchen, the oil leaks which made the furnace inoperative, and the
locks on the door. The trial court found for the plaintiff; the de-
fendant appealed and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed in
Posnanski v. Hood.' The court, concerned with the city council's
method of enforcing the city housing code, found no indication that
the city council intended the housing code regulations to be an im-
plied part of any lease.2 The defendant urged that the lease contract
was illegal because it violated public policy, but the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court held that the defense of an illegal contract was not
available to the defendant.
The Milwaukee housing ordinance at issue in Posnanski was enacted
to cope with housing problems in the city. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in an earlier decision took notice of existing substandard con-
ditions, and recognized that the stated purpose of the housing code
was to eliminate them.3 However, the Posnanski court followed the
traditional common law concept which considers each leasehold an
1. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
2. Id. at 182, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
3. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 397, 173 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1970).
Defendant had reported violations of the Milwaukee Housing Code. Upon re-
ceiving notice of violations, the landlord immediately informed the defendant that
his lease was terminated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the defendant
could raise the defense of retaliatory eviction but he would have to prove that
the conditions existed, that the landlord knew the defendant had reported the
conditions, and that the landlord's sole purpose of termination was retaliatory. I.
at 399, 173 N.W.2d at 302.
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estate,4 treats covenants as independent,5 and, holds that a housing
regulation ordinance does not enlarge the scope of the landlord and
tenant relationship.6
In reaching its decision the Posnanski court relied heavily on
Saunders v. First National Realty Corp." in which the landlord filed
actions for possession because of nonpayment of rent.8 The defendants
in Saunders offered proof of approximately 1,500 violations of the
housing regulations of the District of Columbia. However, the trial
court refused to admit the evidence and entered judgment against
the defendants for possession.9 The Saunders court "refused to hold
that violations occurring after the tenancy is created void the lease."10
The Posnanski court reiterated the Saunders opinion in refusing to
grant relief to the defendant.11
Remedies for the slum tenant have been explored and various legal
techniques have been suggested. Principal among these are illegal
contract, rent withholding, and constructive eviction, but these three
have met with limited success in the courts1 2 The illegal contract
theory tried by the defendant in Posnanski has met with success only
when a violation occurred prior to occupancy 1 3 In Brown v. Southall
Realty Co.14 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
the lease void because the landlord had notice of the violations and
was notified by the housing division to correct the violations prior to
renting again. The landlord executed a lease without making any
repairs and the court held the lease void as an illegal contract.15
4. I AmERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (Casner ed. 1952).
5. Id.
6. Metcalf v. Chiprin, 217 Cal. App. 2d 305, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1963);
Rubinger v. Del Monte, 217 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Davar Holdings, Inc.,
v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 828, 21
N.E .2d 882 (1939).
7. Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Mun. App.
1968), rev'd sub nom. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). This reversal came after the Posnanski decision.
8. 245 A.2d at 837.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 838.
11. 46 Wis. 2d at 179, 174 N.W.2d at 531.
12. Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL. BAR JOURNAL 204
(1969); Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MiOH. L. REv. 869 (1967);
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Gno. L.J.
519 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Schoshinsi].
13. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mur. App. 1968).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 836.
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When the violations occur during the tenancy, as in Posnanski and
Saunders, it is suggested by one writer that the primary weapon at
the tenant's disposal is the withholding of some or all of the rent.1 6
Although rent withholding has been legalized by statute in some juris-
dictions,27 absent such statutory power the Posnanski court was un-
willing to allow this as a means of housing code enforcement.18 The
Posnanski decision indicated that the defendant could have used the
statutory defense of constructive eviction;19 however, Hood did not
plead it or in any way indicate any intention to use it.20
The plea of constructive eviction is the remedy when the tenant's
right to quiet enjoyment (the right to enjoy the premises unimpaired)
has been breached.21 However, implicit in a pleading of constructive
eviction is actual abandonment of the premises, for unless there has
been abandonment, the tenant's quiet enjoyment (theoretically) has
not been interrupted.22 But it seems impractical to expect a slum
tenant to have an adequate amount of housing at his disposal or the
financial resources to make it feasible for him to move in order to get
the violations corrected. There should be relief at equity for the
tenant; he should not be required to vacate the premises.23
Housing regulations impose upon a landlord a duty to maintain
the premises.2 4 Courts have consistently found the landlord liable in
actions for personal injuries caused by his failure to comply with the
regulations.25 Thus, when it is not possible for the tenant to seek
other housing and the tenant's relief at law is not adequate, he should
be able to turn to equity.
16. Schoshinski at 528.
17. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143b (McKinney 1966); see also CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1942 (Deering 1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1959).
18. 46 Wis. 2d at 183, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
19. Wis. STAT. § 234.17 (1957). Lessee may surrender premises, when
Where any buildings, which is leased or occupied, is . .. so injured by the
elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occu-
pancy, . . . the lessee or occupant may . . . quit and surrender possession of
the leasehold premises . . . and he is not liable to pay . . . rent for the time
subsequent to the surrender. Id.
20. 46 Wis. 2d at 176, 174 N.W.2d at 529.
21. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 72 (1962).
22. Id.
23. Schoshinski at 532.
24. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
25. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
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Relief based on the illegal contract theory, reduced to its simplest
form, amounts to acceptance of an implied covenant of habitability.
Although this theory did not exist at common law, it is gaining
ground with the passage of housing code regulations.2 Courts are re-
examining the old doctrine of caveat emptor and finding it no longer
applicable.2 ' There is an indication that the slum tenant is about to
receive a long-awaited, much-needed remedy in court. A Hawaii case,
Lemle v. Breeden,28 has stated that a lease for residential premises
contains an implied warranty of habitability and fitness. The Supreme
Court of Hawaii recognized that the modem lease is much different
than the lease at common law, and affirmed the fact that "a lease is,
in essence, a sale as well as a transfer of an estate in land and is, more
importantly, a contractual relationship." 29 Since the court found this
relationship, the court implied a "warranty of habitability and fitness
for the purposes intended ... 30
Following the lead of Lemle, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded the Saunders
case, supra,31 in Javins v. First National Realty Corp.32 The appellate
court acknowledged in Javins that common law rulings concerning
leases were not applicable to the modem urban dwelling lease, and
held that the housing code regulation by its terms applied to the re-
pair and maintenance of the unit during the term of a lease.33 The
Javins court held "that the Housing Regulations imply a warranty
of habitability, measured by the standards which they set out, into
leases of all housing that they cover."3' 4 Thus, a major step for tenant
remedies has been made.
The Posnanski court was unnecessarily concerned with whether the
legislature intended the housing regulations to be enforced admin-
istratively or by the terms of a lease. The intent of the council was
clear; it passed the regulations to help eliminate the problem of sub-
26. Schoshinski at 532.
27. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961).
28. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
29. Id. at -, 462 P.2d at 474.
30. Id.
31. Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Mun. App.
1968), ree/d sub nom. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
32. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
33. Id. at 1081.
34. Id. at 1082.
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standard housing. The Javins court even relied on the earlier Wis-
consin Supreme Court decision of Pines v. Perssion.5 The Javins
court said: "We think the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin as to the effect of a housing code on the old common
law rule cannot be avoided:3 6
.[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially
(and politically) desirable to impose these duties [to repair] on
a property owner-which has rendered the old common-law rule
obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habit-
ability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the
current legislative policy concerning housing standards."
37
The Posnanski court could have taken a progressive step forward
and reinforced the decisions of Lemle and Pines. By considering the
enforcement issue, Posnanski followed the traditional view, and failed
to recognize tenants' rights.
Alan M. Hux
35. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
36. 428 F.2d at 1082.
37. 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13, quoted in 428 F.2d at 1082.
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